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Old NFT Approvals Drained in Payment Processor Exploit

Attackers abused a retired Limit Break contract once used by Magic Eden, stealing about $2.8M from wallets that approved it years ago.

A flaw in a smart contract that Magic Eden stopped using in 2024 has been used to steal NFTs and tokens from wallets that approved it long ago, Shattered reports.

What happened

From September 24, attackers exploited Limit Break's Payment Processor V2, which Magic Eden used for EVM trades from about February to October 2024. The bug let an attacker fake the sender of a forwarded transaction, moving assets without a new signature.

Wallets that had granted the contract "approve for all" permission years earlier were still exposed — even though Magic Eden had moved on.

The numbers

  • About $2.8 million in assets stolen, including roughly 660 WETH not recovered.
  • 23,155 NFTs worth over $5.7 million moved to a protective wallet by white-hat researchers led by Yuga Labs' 0xQuit.

Why it matters

Token approvals do not expire. When you list an NFT or trade on a marketplace, you often give a contract permanent permission to move your assets. If that contract is later found to be flawed — even after the marketplace stops using it — your wallet is still at risk.

How to protect your wallet

  • Review your approvals with a tool such as Revoke.cash or your wallet's built-in permissions page.
  • Revoke anything from marketplaces or apps you no longer use.
  • Keep valuable NFTs in a separate wallet that never connects to trading sites.

Timeline of the exploit

According to the Revoke.cash Exploit Database, the first known malicious transaction occurred on September 24, 2026, when an attacker stole roughly 305 NFTs — including 10 Meebits, 50 Otherdeeds, 10 World of Women NFTs and 235 Desperate ApeWives — and sold them directly into existing marketplace bids Revoke.cash. It took more than 12 hours for the incident to be reported to security researcher 0xQuit, vice president of blockchain at Yuga Labs, who then discovered that a far larger number of NFTs across the ecosystem were vulnerable to the same bug CryptoBriefing.

Once the vulnerable contracts were publicly named the next morning, copycat attackers moved quickly, draining approximately 580 WETH along with USDC, POL and other tokens across Ethereum, Polygon, Base, Arbitrum and ApeChain, and taking thousands more NFTs in the process Revoke.cash. The single largest individual drain, around 280 WETH, was carried out not by the original attacker but by an MEV (maximal extractable value) bot that copied another attacker's transaction in real time to front-run it Revoke.cash. By September 25 at 12:00 UTC, Revoke.cash pegged confirmed losses at a minimum of $2.8 million Revoke.cash.

Limit Break responded by pausing Payment Processor V3, which shared the same underlying flaw, though Payment Processor V2 itself could not be paused, which is why the whitehat rescue operation became necessary instead of a simple shutdown CryptoBriefing. Magic Eden issued an interim public update on September 25, 2026, confirming it had stopped using Payment Processor V2 in October 2024 and had shut down its EVM marketplace entirely in the first quarter of 2026 ChainReport.

How the Payment Processor vulnerability worked technically

Payment Processor is infrastructure built by Limit Break for NFT marketplaces, designed to handle settlement logic so that a buyer and seller can complete a trade without both needing to sign a single joint transaction. Magic Eden ran its EVM-based trading through Payment Processor V2 for roughly eight months in 2024 before switching away from it Shattered.

The core flaw lay in how Payment Processor supports meta-transactions through "trusted forwarder" contracts — a mechanism that lets a third party relay a transaction on a user's behalf. Critically, anyone can deploy their own trusted forwarder contract. By combining a custom forwarder with specially crafted calldata, an attacker could trick Payment Processor into believing that a completely different, unsuspecting wallet was the actual counterparty to a trade — without that wallet ever signing anything Revoke.cash.

This identity-spoofing bug could be abused in two distinct ways, according to Revoke.cash's technical analysis. First, for wallets that had granted Payment Processor permission to transfer their NFTs, an attacker could have that wallet "accept" the attacker's own zero-price offer, transferring the NFT to the attacker for free. Second, for wallets that had approved WETH or other ERC-20 tokens so they could make purchase offers, an attacker could list a worthless NFT and force the victim wallet to "buy" it, draining the approved tokens to the attacker instead Revoke.cash.

Importantly, Revoke.cash noted that cancelling a listing or invalidating a signature after the fact does not protect a wallet, because the attack does not rely on any live listing or signature at all — it relies purely on the dormant token approval that the wallet granted to the Payment Processor contract back in 2024 Revoke.cash. That is what makes this incident different from a typical phishing-signature drain: the victims did nothing wrong recently. The exposure came entirely from a permission granted roughly two years earlier to a contract most users had long forgotten about.

Untangling the different dollar figures

Coverage of this incident has cited several different numbers, and it is worth being precise about what each one measures. The $2.8 million figure represents actual confirmed losses — assets that left victim wallets and were not recovered, as tracked by Revoke.cash, with roughly 660 WETH reported as the unrecovered portion Shattered. The $5.7 million figure, covering 23,155 NFTs, instead represents assets that were proactively rescued before attackers could steal them — moved into a protective custody wallet by the whitehat team rather than being lost CryptoBriefing. These are not the same pool of assets, and a given news report's total exposure figure depends on whether it is counting stolen funds, rescued funds, or both.

The investigation also surfaced a related vulnerability on ApeChain, where some assets approved to Payment Processor V3 needed to be secured through a similar rescue effort, broadening the scope of the incident beyond the original EVM chains CryptoBriefing.

Why old, "abandoned" approvals remain dangerous

This incident is a case study in a structural problem across Ethereum-style blockchains: token approvals granted to a smart contract do not automatically expire when a platform stops using that contract, when a user stops trading, or even when years pass. A marketplace can retire a piece of underlying infrastructure entirely, as Magic Eden did with Payment Processor V2 back in October 2024, and the approvals users granted to interact with it simply sit there, unrevoked, until either the user manually removes them or an attacker finds a way to exploit them ChainReport.

Because Magic Eden's current, live marketplace listings were not affected — only historical approvals tied to listings made roughly between February and October 2024 — many affected users likely had no idea they were still at risk, since they may not have used Magic Eden's EVM marketplace at all in the intervening two years Bitzo.

How to protect your wallet, in detail

  • Review your approvals regularly with a tool such as Revoke.cash or your wallet's built-in permissions page, not just after you hear about an exploit.
  • Revoke anything from marketplaces or apps you no longer use, especially contracts tied to platforms that have since changed their trading infrastructure or shut down entirely.
  • Keep valuable NFTs in a separate wallet that never connects to trading sites or signs approval transactions, sometimes called a "cold" or storage wallet.
  • Understand that revoking an approval does not recover assets already transferred — revocation is purely preventive, so it needs to happen before an exploit, not after Bitzo.
  • Be aware that even a dormant listing you forgot about years ago can carry a live, exploitable approval today.

What readers should do

  • Go to Revoke.cash (or your wallet provider's equivalent permissions dashboard) today and check every active token and NFT approval tied to your address, across every chain you have ever used, not just the one you trade on now.
  • Specifically search for and revoke any approval to Limit Break's Payment Processor contracts (V2 or V3) if you ever listed or traded on Magic Eden's EVM marketplace between February and October 2024.
  • Revoke approvals for any marketplace, bridge, or dApp you have not actively used in the last several months, treating "unused" as a risk signal by default.
  • Move high-value NFTs and tokens into a separate wallet that is never used to sign marketplace approvals, keeping your "trading" wallet and your "storage" wallet strictly separate going forward.
  • If you suspect your wallet was already affected, check the Revoke.cash Exploit Database entry for Magic Eden/Limit Break to see whether your address is listed among those targeted, and contact the whitehat rescue effort's published channels if your assets appear in the affected set.
  • Make approval reviews a recurring habit — for example, every few months — rather than a one-time reaction to a single news story, since the underlying risk (permanent approvals) does not go away after this specific incident is resolved.

By · Published · Updated · 11 min read

Sources & Verification

Additional reporting

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