China-Linked Hackers Target Asian Governments with Antino
Cisco Talos says UAT-11587 hit at least 16 government and policy groups in eight Asian countries with a Rust backdoor run through Microsoft 365.
Cisco Talos has uncovered a China-linked group, UAT-11587, targeting government and policy organizations across Asia, Talos reports.
Targets
- Countries including Taiwan, India, the Philippines and Cambodia, as well as Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar and Syria, bringing the total to eight Asian countries, according to Talos researcher Ashley Shen.
- At least 16 organizations across those eight Asian countries by July 2026.
- Academic, think-tank and civil society groups working on policy.
Talos first observed UAT-11587 activity in September 2025, and first identified the campaign while investigating a spear-phishing effort directed at Taiwan's academic, think tank, and civil society policy community in March 2026. Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-11587 is China-nexus, based on development artifacts, preparation-environment indicators, and targeting patterns.
The Antino backdoor
- Written in Rust for Windows.
- Can run commands, transfer files, load code in memory and survive reboots (persistence).
- Supports host reconnaissance, shell and PowerShell execution, in addition to file transfer and in-memory shellcode loading.
- Communicates only through Microsoft 365, using Microsoft Graph to talk via Outlook and OneDrive — described by Talos as acting like "dead drops" rather than a traditional command-and-control server.
How victims were infected
Spear-phishing emails with tailored decoy documents, including one that recreated Gmail's attachment interface, led to a five-stage infection chain. The group relied heavily on Cloudflare infrastructure for delivery, execution tracking, and payload staging, and separately used DLL sideloading techniques as part of its infection process, according to a technical summary published by OffSeq's Threat Radar.
Attribution indicators cited by researchers, including metadata artifacts showing Simplified Chinese language usage, UTC+8 timestamps consistent with China's time zone, and the use of China-focused Rust package mirrors during development, further support the China-nexus assessment, according to OffSeq's analysis.
One security firm estimated the campaign had compromised approximately 350 endpoints across at least 16 institutional environments between September 2025 and July 2026, according to TechJack Solutions' intelligence briefing, which characterized the operation as "a precision, long-duration intelligence collection operation that standard network monitoring tools are not positioned to detect."
Within those eight countries, Talos said that as of its reporting period, 10 organizations were confirmed compromised, five were suspected victims, and one was a confirmed target without confirmed compromise, according to reporting by Taiwanese outlet iThome, which also covered the disclosure.
Why it matters
Malware that talks through Outlook and OneDrive blends in with normal office traffic, making it very hard to spot on the network. Because Microsoft Graph traffic to Outlook and OneDrive is a routine, expected part of day-to-day enterprise activity for any organisation using Microsoft 365, security teams relying on traditional network-based detection — watching for connections to unusual or known-malicious external IP addresses — have little chance of spotting Antino's command-and-control traffic without specifically looking for anomalous patterns within the Graph API itself. This approach reflects a broader trend among state-linked espionage groups of abusing legitimate cloud services precisely because their traffic is difficult to distinguish from normal business use, and because it removes the need for attackers to stand up and maintain their own dedicated infrastructure that could otherwise be identified and blocked.
The campaign's focus on government, legislative, defense and policy-adjacent organisations — including academic and civil society groups rather than only formal government ministries — is consistent with a long-running pattern of Chinese state-linked intelligence collection targeting individuals and institutions that influence or analyze regional policy on topics such as Taiwan's status, territorial disputes, and broader Indo-Pacific security issues.
Infrastructure used in the campaign
Talos and other researchers documented UAT-11587's reliance on disposable web infrastructure to host decoy documents and deliver payloads. Indicators published by the Gurucul community portal include dozens of short-lived Cloudflare Pages subdomains, Amazon CloudFront and R2 storage links, and lookalike domains such as `microsoft-flash.com` and `wps-cn.com` used to distribute files disguised as Flash Player or WPS Office installers, according to Gurucul's threat research summary. Some decoy file names referenced genuine-sounding institutional events, such as an "Institutional Disciplinary Action Report" and material referencing the "May 27 inauguration" of a named policy institute, reflecting the tailored, research-intensive nature of the group's phishing lures.
A separate commercial intelligence briefing assigned the campaign a CVSS base score of 9.5 and tracked it as SCC-CAM-2026-0862, describing Antino's command-and-control design as making malicious traffic "functionally indistinguishable from normal enterprise Microsoft 365 usage," according to TechJack Solutions' published PDF briefing.
Who the victims are
Talos's targeting data shows the campaign is concentrated on organisations engaged in setting or analysing government policy rather than purely military or defense targets, spanning Taiwan's academic and civil society policy community, Indian institutions, and similar organisations in the Philippines, Cambodia, Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar and Syria. This breadth suggests an intelligence-gathering operation aimed at understanding regional policy positions and diplomatic deliberations rather than a narrowly scoped attack against a single government.
Why the China attribution is notable
Talos researcher Ashley Shen, who authored the disclosure, said Talos "assesses with high confidence that UAT-11587 is China-nexus," a conclusion based on development artifacts, preparation-environment indicators and targeting patterns rather than any single piece of evidence. Talos first identified the cluster while investigating a March 2026 spear-phishing campaign against Taiwan's academic, think-tank and civil-society policy community, a sector that has long been a priority target for Chinese state-linked intelligence collection given its influence over public debate on cross-strait and regional security issues.
What defenders should do
- Monitor for unusual Microsoft Graph API use by non-standard applications, including unexpected OAuth application registrations or anomalous API call patterns against Outlook and OneDrive.
- Train policy staff, who are prime espionage targets, to verify unexpected documents, especially attachments that mimic familiar email interfaces such as Gmail's attachment viewer.
- Audit and restrict third-party application permissions granted within your organisation's Microsoft 365 tenant, since abuse of legitimate Graph API access is central to how Antino operates.
- Review DLL sideloading and scheduled-task-based persistence techniques as part of endpoint detection rules, given the five-stage infection chain Talos documented.
What readers should do
- If you work at a government agency, think tank, university policy programme, or civil society organisation in Asia, treat unsolicited documents referencing policy topics with particular caution, even if they appear to come from a known contact.
- IT and security teams at potentially targeted organisations should review Talos's published indicators of compromise and Microsoft Graph API hunting guidance to check for signs of Antino activity in their own environments.
- Enable conditional access policies and monitor OAuth app consent grants within Microsoft 365 tenants to reduce the risk of a malicious application gaining persistent API access.
- Report any suspected spear-phishing attempts referencing policy, diplomatic, or government topics to your organisation's security team and, where appropriate, to national cybersecurity authorities.
- Keep software and endpoint protection tools updated, and consider engaging a managed detection and response provider if your organisation lacks in-house capability to hunt for cloud-based command-and-control abuse.
Sources & Verification
Additional reporting
- Cisco Talosblog.talosintelligence.com
- TechJack Solutionstechjacksolutions.com
- OffSeq Threat Radarradar.offseq.com
- iThomeithome.com.tw
- Gurucul Community Portalcommunity.gurucul.com
- TechJack Solutions SCC-CAM-2026-0862 briefingtechjacksolutions.com



