Lunex Stealer Disables Security Tools Before Striking
Ontinue found a four-stage Lunex attack on Ukrainian speakers that uses fake CAPTCHAs and a vulnerable driver before stealing passwords and crypto.
Researchers at Ontinue have reverse-engineered a four-stage attack linked to the Lunex malware-as-a-service platform, the company reports.
The attack chain
- A fake CAPTCHA page tricks the victim into running an installer.
- A loader, dubbed LunexLoader, bypasses Windows User Account Control using the CMSTPLUA COM object and raises its privileges The Hacker News.
- It uses a vulnerable driver ("bring your own vulnerable driver", or BYOVD) to switch off kernel-level security monitoring.
- The final stealer, also a remote control agent, runs undetected.
The stealer was compiled on September 12, 2026, showing it is actively developed.
Which driver it abuses
Lunex exploits CVE-2023-20598, a vulnerable AMD Radeon Software kernel driver called PDFWKRNL.sys, to escalate privileges and blind security processes The Hacker News. Rather than killing security tools outright, the loader leaves endpoint detection and response (EDR) processes running but "blind" by zeroing out kernel callback entries — specifically `PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutine`, `PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutine` and `PspLoadImageNotifyRoutine` — so those products never see the malicious activity that follows CyberNewsAI. The loader determines exact kernel memory offsets to target by downloading the target machine's own debugging symbols (PDB files) from Microsoft's public Symbol Server, a technique that makes the attack work across different Windows 10 and 11 builds without needing to hardcode offsets for each version CyberNewsAI. One Ontinue test found the specific driver variant loaded even though it should have been blocked by Windows' Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) and Microsoft's Vulnerable Driver Blocklist NeoTeo.
What it steals
- Credentials and data from seven Chromium-based browsers
- Cryptocurrency wallets
- Persistent remote access to files through a hidden browser component installed as a PowerShell-based Native Messaging Host
Scale of the operation
The Lunex command-and-control platform was first documented through open-source research in June 2026 and has grown quickly since. Researchers have identified 28 Lunex command-and-control panels spread across 13 countries, up from just six panels previously documented — a sign the platform is being actively sold to and used by multiple criminal groups rather than a single operator SC World. The initial infection commonly spreads through compromised Ukrainian websites using ClickFix-style fake Cloudflare verification checks, delivering a payload researchers call Psychedelic Stealer as part of the broader Lunex platform The Hacker News.
Who is behind it
Ontinue believes it was built by a Russian-speaking team and sold to criminals. Researcher Rhys Downing told Security Magazine it is a "financially motivated, CIS-aligned threat actor". It targets Ukrainian-speaking users. In Ontinue's own technical report, Downing described the chain plainly: "The attack chain begins with a fake CAPTCHA page and culminates in the deployment of a fully-featured C2 agent," adding that "the stealer extracts credentials and data from seven Chromium-based browsers, exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallets, and establishes persistent remote filesystem access through a PowerShell-based Native Messaging Host installed within the victim's browser" The Hacker News.
Why BYOVD before a stealer is unusual
Security researchers note that pairing a kernel-level BYOVD evasion chain with a relatively "lower tier" payload like an information stealer is uncommon; BYOVD techniques are typically reserved for higher-stakes operations like ransomware deployment, where defenders are more likely to be actively hunting. Using it here suggests the Lunex operators are investing significant engineering effort specifically to keep their credential and crypto theft campaigns running undetected for longer.
How to defend against it
- Never run commands or installers from CAPTCHA pages.
- Businesses should block known vulnerable drivers and alert on attempts to stop security tools.
- Maintain and enforce Microsoft's Vulnerable Driver Blocklist, and consider application control policies (e.g., WDAC) that block PDFWKRNL.sys and similar known-vulnerable drivers by hash or signature.
- Monitor for unusual processes downloading PDB symbol files from msdl.microsoft.com, which is an atypical behavior for most legitimate software outside of development tools.
What readers should do
- Never copy and paste commands into Terminal, PowerShell, or the Windows Run dialog because a webpage's CAPTCHA or verification page told you to.
- If you are Ukrainian-speaking or operate Ukrainian-facing websites, treat fake Cloudflare or CAPTCHA verification prompts with extra suspicion, since this campaign specifically targets that user base.
- Keep browser-stored passwords to a minimum; use a dedicated password manager instead, since browser credential stores are a primary target of this stealer.
- Move cryptocurrency into a hardware wallet rather than keeping meaningful balances in browser-based software wallets.
- IT and security teams should ensure endpoint protection products are configured with kernel callback integrity monitoring, since this malware specifically targets and blinds those callbacks rather than terminating the security process outright.
- If you suspect infection, do not trust antivirus "all clear" results alone — this malware is specifically designed to blind, not disable, those tools, so a full reinstall or professional forensic review may be warranted.
Why malware-as-a-service platforms matter
Lunex follows a model common among modern cybercrime operations: rather than one group running every attack, the platform's developers build and maintain the stealer, loader and command-and-control infrastructure, then rent or sell access to other criminals who run their own campaigns against victims of their choosing. This division of labor lowers the technical bar for launching a sophisticated attack and makes it harder for defenders and law enforcement to attribute any single campaign to one actor, since many unrelated criminal groups can be using the same underlying toolkit simultaneously across different countries and targets.
Context: the ClickFix epidemic
Lunex's initial infection vector, a fake CAPTCHA page, is part of a broader technique known as ClickFix that has spread rapidly across both Windows and macOS campaigns over the past two years. These pages mimic routine security checks and instruct the visitor to copy a command and paste it into a terminal or run dialog themselves, which sidesteps browser and email security controls because the victim, not an automated exploit, executes the malicious code. Security vendors have reported steep growth in ClickFix-based campaigns, and the technique's apparent simplicity has not stopped it from being paired with increasingly advanced payloads like Lunex's kernel-level evasion chain.
What this means for Windows defenders broadly
Because Lunex's BYOVD technique abuses a legitimate, signed AMD driver rather than custom malicious code, traditional signature-based antivirus detection struggles to flag the driver itself as malicious. Defenders are instead encouraged to focus on behavioral indicators, such as unexpected kernel driver loads from non-standard paths, unusual PDB symbol downloads, and gaps in telemetry that suggest security callbacks have been tampered with rather than simply disabled.
Takeaway for organizations
Security teams should treat any report of an information stealer targeting their region or industry as a signal to also check for the kind of kernel-level evasion seen in Lunex, since criminals increasingly borrow techniques between malware families once they prove effective.
Sources & Verification
Additional reporting
- Ontinueontinue.com
- Security Magazinesecuritymagazine.com
- The Hacker Newsthehackernews.com
- SC Worldscworld.com
- NeoTeoneoteo.com
- CyberNewsAIcybernewsai.com



