Russia's Star Blizzard Swaps ClickFix for RedFlick
Microsoft says Star Blizzard now uses a one-click technique called RedFlick to deploy its CosmicPulse backdoor against Ukraine-linked targets.
Russia-linked hacking group Star Blizzard has changed how it infects victims, Dark Reading reports, citing Microsoft Threat Intelligence.
Who they target
Star Blizzard has been active since 2017 and targets journalists, NGOs, think tanks and Russia experts — especially those supporting Ukraine. Microsoft and US officials disrupted the group two years ago.
Microsoft says it is "highly confident" the group is subordinate to Center 18 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), a part of the agency long associated with cyberespionage against Western governments, NGOs and academics, according to SecurityWeek. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has made the same assessment. Security agencies in the US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand said as far back as December 2023 that Star Blizzard "almost certainly" operates under FSB Center 18, according to The Hacker News.
What has changed
- Since January 2026, the group has used a new technique Microsoft calls RedFlick.
- RedFlick sets up scheduled tasks to install the group's Python backdoor, CosmicPulse.
- Unlike its previous ClickFix method, which needed several actions from the victim, RedFlick needs just one click.
- The group has also moved to larger-scale phishing, with Microsoft counting at least 13 larger campaigns in 2026 alone, each sending tens to hundreds of emails, on top of its usual narrowly targeted spear-phishing, according to The Hacker News.
- Since March 2026, those mass campaigns have used email accounts on compromised WordPress and cPanel websites, which Microsoft is "highly confident" the group hacked specifically for this purpose — a shift from its earlier reliance on free email services such as Proton and Microsoft consumer accounts.
How a RedFlick attack unfolds
According to BleepingComputer's technical breakdown of Microsoft's research, a RedFlick attack begins with a phishing email — often an event invitation — followed by a second message containing a password-protected ZIP or RAR archive. That archive contains a VHDX virtual disk file with an LNK file disguised as a PDF. When the victim opens the file, it launches a command in a hidden window while displaying a decoy PDF to distract them.
The hidden commands download and run an MSI installer that creates three scheduled tasks disguised as legitimate Windows maintenance components:
- Internet Quality Test Connection — sends the victim's computer and network name and username to the attackers and can execute a remote DLL.
- Network Configuration Manager — prepares Windows' WebDAV functionality so remote web resources can be accessed through file-style paths.
- System Health Monitor — uses the Windows `control.exe` utility to execute a remotely hosted next-stage payload.
Because these scheduled tasks mimic names Windows users and IT administrators would normally expect to see, the technique helps the malware blend into legitimate system activity and evade detection, Microsoft said in its research blog.
Between January and August 2026 alone, the group launched more than a dozen campaigns containing a RedFlick lure attachment, often posing as Ukrainian authorities or a reputable think tank or NGO, with invitations naming well-known organisations such as Chatham House and the Atlantic Council as supposed hosts, according to The Hacker News. Many of the phishing emails were deliberately crafted to appear as though they came from within the target's own organisation.
Scale of the campaign
Microsoft says the RedFlick-related activity has affected more than 100 organizations since January 2026, primarily in the United States and United Kingdom, according to eSecurity Planet. The targets span Ukrainian individuals and institutions, international NGOs, Western think tanks, governments, and financial institutions that have provided political or financial support to Ukraine.
Background: Star Blizzard's history and prior disruption
Star Blizzard, also tracked by other vendors under names like "Callisto Group" or "COLDRIVER," has a long track record of credential-theft campaigns, typically by posing as people known to their targets and tricking them into entering email passwords on fake login pages. By 2023 the group was already using fake conference and event invitations as a lure, often exchanging several messages with a target to build trust before sending a malicious link. In 2025 it adopted the "ClickFix" technique — tricking victims into pasting and running commands via a fake CAPTCHA verification page — as well as other delivery methods such as links shared over WhatsApp.
In 2023, Microsoft and US and UK government officials announced a coordinated disruption effort against Star Blizzard, seizing dozens of domains the group used for its phishing infrastructure. The emergence of RedFlick in 2026 shows that disruption did not end the group's operations; instead, it adapted its tradecraft to reduce the number of steps a victim needs to take and to automate malware delivery further.
Why it matters
Fewer steps means more victims fall for it, and a wider net means people who never considered themselves targets may now receive these emails. Reducing the infection chain from several required actions down to a single click significantly lowers the bar for a successful compromise, particularly against less technical staff at NGOs and advocacy organisations who may not have dedicated IT security teams.
How at-risk groups can protect themselves
- Verify unexpected documents or meeting requests by contacting the sender another way, ideally through a previously known phone number or separate communication channel.
- Use phishing-resistant sign-in methods (passkeys or hardware security keys) rather than passwords and SMS codes alone.
- Consider free protection programmes for high-risk users, such as Google's Advanced Protection Program.
- Be suspicious of emails that arrive as a two-part sequence — an initial invitation followed by a password-protected archive — since this pattern matches the RedFlick delivery chain.
- Disable or closely monitor the automatic mounting of virtual disk (VHDX) files from email attachments where possible, as this is central to how the malware is delivered.
What readers should do
- If you work at an NGO, think tank, newsroom, or advocacy group connected to Ukraine or Russia policy, treat unsolicited event invitations — especially those followed by password-protected attachments — with heightened suspicion.
- Report suspected RedFlick-style phishing emails to your IT or security team immediately rather than opening attachments to "check" them.
- Enable phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (passkeys, FIDO2 security keys) on your email and cloud storage accounts.
- If you believe you may have already opened a suspicious VHDX or LNK file, disconnect your device from the network and contact your security team or Microsoft's incident response guidance.
- Review Microsoft's published indicators of compromise and hunting queries if you are a security professional responsible for monitoring an at-risk organisation's network.
Sources & Verification
Additional reporting
- Dark Readingdarkreading.com
- Microsoft Security Blogmicrosoft.com
- BleepingComputerbleepingcomputer.com
- SecurityWeeksecurityweek.com
- eSecurity Planetesecurityplanet.com
- The Hacker Newsthehackernews.com



